
Our Lawless Roads: Road policing, casualties and driving offences since 2010, England and Wales

RoadPeace
The national charity for road crash victims



Foreword

The worrying rise in the number of vulnerable road users being killed or seriously hurt outside of London is likely to be the impact of the ongoing cuts to the policing of our roads.



Since austerity started in 2010 we have lost over a quarter of our traffic police in areas outside of London and there has been an inevitable big drop in the enforcement of driving offences by officers on the road. The long-term consequences are severe as we experience a decline in the prosecution of cases requiring investigation, court appearances and police time. More and more drivers appear to be getting away with bad driving and many others with causing death and injury.

First, the number of drivers prosecuted for causing a death by driving has declined far faster than the number of fatal collisions. Either the standard of driving has improved dramatically since 2010 or there is a link between the decline in the number of drivers prosecuted and the cuts to police numbers and the resources for collision investigation.

Secondly, there is a potential link between the low numbers prosecuted and the high numbers of hit and run drivers. Curiously, police find it impossible to provide evidence to show how many reported hit and runs involving a death or injury result in prosecutions. This requires urgent investigation.

Thirdly, there has been a steadily increasing focus on crimes that can be addressed by electronic enforcement, such as speeding, alongside a decline in offences that require an officer on the street. This has been accompanied by a massive shift towards the use of driver education courses, rather than penalty points and fines. The scale of this shift needs to be questioned as the evidence for the effectiveness of these courses has yet to be determined.

The last six years have seen a turn-around in the pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists being seriously injured in England and Wales, outside of the London area. Instead of the rapid decline in all types of casualties we saw between 2000 to 2010, we have seen a rise in those who are least protected by the advances in vehicle design safety measures. Vehicles have got safer, while our roads have got more dangerous.

I first started working with RoadPeace when I was the Mayor of London's Road Safety Ambassador 2001–2008. It was a period when we reduced casualties far faster in the capital than in any other region of the country.

Due to the political support of the London Mayor's office and money from Transport for London, the number of traffic police in London has been relatively protected since 2001. This contrasts with the rapid decline in traffic police throughout the rest of England and Wales. There are many reasons why London has had continued success in making roads safer, while the rest of the country has got worse, but roads policing appears to be one of the biggest factors. The lesson is clear. If you want to save lives and prevent injuries on the road you need to reverse the cuts in traffic police numbers.

Jenny Jones
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb
Green Party
House of Lords
RoadPeace Patron

Contents

Foreword	i
Content	ii
Key findings	iii
RoadPeace Calls	iv-v
Introduction	1
Report structure	1
Trends in KSI casualties	2
London vs rest of England and Wales	3
Numbers of Traffic Officers	4-5
Trends in enforcement: How traffic offences are dealt with	6
Growth in use of diversionary courses	6
Expanding share of speeding	7
Declining role of traffic officers in enforcement	8
Safety critical driving offences	9
Causing death by driving offences	9
Failing to stop (Hit and run)	10
Dangerous driving	10
Drink and drug driving	11
Disqualified driving	12
Uninsured driving	12
Careless driving offences	12
Mobile phone use while driving	13
Non-wearing of seat belts	14
Summary for Safety Critical Offences	14
Conclusions	15
Appendix 1. Trends in Killed and Seriously Injured (KSI)	16
Appendix 2. Traffic police officers in England and Wales, 31 March 2010 to 31 March 2015	17-18
Appendix 3. Fixed Penalty Notices	19
Appendix 4. National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme	20
Appendix 5. Court Prosecutions for Motoring Offences, 2010-15	21
Appendix 6. Causing death by driving offences – investigation outcomes	22
Appendix 7. KSIs/Dangerous driving prosecution by Police Area 2010-15	23
Bibliography	24

Key findings

Killed and seriously injured

- ▶ Number of people Killed and Seriously Injured (KSI) has stopped declining. Between 2005-09, KSI dropped by 16%, but only by 1% between 2010-15 in England and Wales.
- ▶ In 2010-15, vulnerable road users (VRU) did worse. Motor vehicle occupant KSIs dropped by 9%, VRU KSIs increased by 5%.
- ▶ In 2010-15, London did better than the rest of England and Wales, with KSI continuing to decrease, including VRU KSIs.

Traffic policing officers

- ▶ With traffic law enforcement not a priority for the Home Office, cuts have fallen disproportionately on roads policing, with a drop of 28% in roads policing officers apart from London.
- ▶ Failure to include traffic policing in the national evaluation of police services and ambivalence of those who vote for the Police and Crime Commissioners may contribute to this.
- ▶ Transport for London has funded roads policing in London and cuts have been less than elsewhere (11% in 2010-14).

Traffic Law Enforcement

- ▶ Traffic disposals (court prosecutions, fixed penalty notices (FPNs) and National Driver Offender Retraining Schemes (NDORS)) rose 2.5% from just under 3 million in 2010 to just over in 2015.
- ▶ FPNs declined whilst NDORS increased from 16% to 45% of all traffic disposals.
- ▶ Court prosecutions remained stable and low volume (just above one in five disposals).
- ▶ Speeding related disposals have risen significantly, from just over half the total in 2010 to nearly three quarters in 2015.
- ▶ Cameras are estimated at less than half of disposals in 2010 but more than two thirds in 2015.

Sanctions for safety critical offences

- ▶ A 5% reduction in fatal collisions but a 23% reduction in causing death by driving offences.
- ▶ A decline in the conviction ratio for causing death by driving offences of seven percentage points, from 85% to 78%.
- ▶ For the non-fatal but serious offences (only dealt with by the courts), there was a 19% reduction overall. This included:
 - Failing to stop, prosecutions down 32%
 - Drink and drug prosecutions down 16%
 - Driving while disqualified down 37%
 - Dangerous driving offences are up 5% (but these are prosecuted only 10 times per day).
- ▶ For the less serious offences, which allow out-of-court disposals, there was 35% decline overall. This included:
 - Mobile phone offences down 1% (at least)
 - Seat belt offences down 67%
 - Careless driving offences down 22%
 - Uninsured driving down 37%.
- ▶ Overall, sanctions for speeding have increased from 70 to 99 per KSI in this period
- ▶ While sanctions for other safety critical offences have declined from 28 to 19 per KSI.

RoadPeace Calls

RoadPeace has long campaigned for road crime to be treated as real crime. This was the headline call for our first Police and Crime Commissioner manifesto (RoadPeace, 2012). Recent trends in KSIs, traffic police numbers and the enforcement of road crime other than speeding has only increased the urgency for this.

Setting priorities

Along with education and engineering, enforcement has always been seen as one of the three pillars of road safety. But, despite pressure from campaigners and calls from the House of Commons Transport Committee following a substantial enquiry last year (HoCTC, 2016a), cuts to traffic police continue. And driving that takes and ruins lives goes undetected, unpunished and undeterred.

RoadPeace call: *The disproportionate cuts made to traffic policing since 2010 should be reversed. With police budgets determined locally, community coalitions will be needed to ensure traffic policing is valued and resourced properly.*

Current police assessments by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) overlook road traffic law enforcement. Their PEEL (Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy) programme excludes road traffic crime and collision investigation.

RoadPeace call: *HMIC should cover road traffic crime prevention and collision investigation in their annual PEEL assessment of police services. Without this, these areas of police activity will continue to be overlooked.*

Better information for local accountability and national monitoring

Police and Crime Commissioners determine local police priorities and approve budgets. Better information is needed so they can make good decisions and so their performance can be assessed by police and crime panels and local voters. In recent years there have been significant and very welcome improvements in the public transparency of court prosecutions by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and of FPNs by the Home Office. Detailed data is now available for both by police service area. However, the use of NDORS courses, which now accounts for almost half of all sanctions, are only reported nationally (though some police areas reported locally (e.g. London (TfL, 2017b)).

RoadPeace call: *If the police and PCCs are to be held accountable, the public must have the facts:*

- ▶ *Data on NDORS courses for each local police service area¹, including the specific offence for which the NDORS course was offered.*
- ▶ *Data should be published in a standard national format, to allow comparisons between areas.*
- ▶ *Data linking reported casualty collisions and court prosecutions for individual cases is needed, particularly for hit and run.*

Agreed indicators

Traffic police have traditionally focused on the Fatal Four; speeding, drink/drug driving, seat belt and using a mobile phone. But there is no agreed set of indicators for enforcement, particularly for those offences that are the key concerns for VRUs.

RoadPeace call: *Monitoring of traffic police requires an agreed set of safety critical offences as performance indicators. The 'Fatal Four' needs to be expanded and updated, with more emphasis on those offences that cause harm to others, e.g. dangerous and careless driving.*

1. This should be designated 'specified data' by the Home Office, see Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, Section 11.

Diversiónary courses

The expansion in the role of NDORS to nearly half of motoring sanctions in 2015 makes it critical that these courses work as effectively as the FPNs and court prosecutions that they replace. They must do two things: first, stop reoffending, by changing the behaviour of those attending the courses; second, they need to deter offending by others.

***RoadPeace call:** A clear demonstration is needed that NDORS deters both offending and reoffending as effectively as penalty points. NDORS could be revised with penalty points given and the course cost reduced, or six penalty points could be given to any driver caught reoffending within three years of attending an NDORS course.*

Introduction

In the May 2011 Strategic Framework for Road Safety, it was stated that *“Road Safety is a priority for the Government. Great Britain has one of the leading road safety records in the world and we want to maintain this record and build upon it.”* (DfT, 2011, p. 13). This did not happen.

The six years between 2010 and 2015 saw a sharp slowing in the long term decline in the number of people killed and seriously injured (KSI) on the roads of England and Wales. The failure to achieve the reductions in KSIs forecast in the Strategic Framework (DfT, 2011) means we are still seeing a correspondingly higher toll of avoidable death and injury, of the economic cost to society and of tragedies for the families and communities affected.

In 2015, a study by PACTS and the RAC Foundation concluded that high level changes policy environment – increased devolution, spending cuts and the move away from target setting – had all had a negative impact on road safety (Amos, Davies, & Fosdick, 2015). In early 2016, the House of Commons Transport Committee (HoCTC) published their report on their inquiry into Road Traffic Law Enforcement which raised a series of related concerns: the decline in traffic police numbers, the decrease in detected motoring offences, the increased use of diversionary courses despite their lack of clear evidence for their effectiveness, and the role of enforcement in making the roads safer for VRUs. In May 2017, a report following an Inquiry by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Cycling found that the justice system is failing to protect cyclists, both by allowing dangerous and inconsiderate driving to go unchecked, and by letting down the victims of road crashes (APPG Cycling, 2017).

Report structure

Our report here updates information on traffic police capacity and on casualties, highlighting the different experience in London with the rest of the country. It then provides a quantified breakdown of changes in the mix of sanctions (court prosecutions, fixed penalty notices and diversionary courses) using trend data available at the national level.

This analysis is used to identify underlying trends in enforcement:

- ▶ The use of diversionary (NDORS) courses
- ▶ The proportion of all sanctions accounted for by speeding
- ▶ The role of police officers in traffic law enforcement

It goes on to examine how safety critical offences are dealt with. Ten offence groupings are reviewed. All require traffic officer involvement (apart from speeding which is largely camera detected), with either investigators reacting to a collision or more general roads **police** conducting targeted enforcement campaigns. For each:

- ▶ the change in the number of sanctions (of all types) between 2010 and 2015 is quantified, and
- ▶ the evidence on compliance is reviewed to see if this provides an explanation for these changes.

Trends in KSI casualties

The number of people killed and seriously injured² (KSI) remains the most common index used for measuring road safety, both nationally and locally. Following a long period of year on year declines in England and Wales, the period since 2010 has seen this indicator plateau. In the five period 2005-09, KSIs declined by nearly five thousand (16%). In the six year period 2010-15, the change was 220 (1%).

The lack of change within the overall total in the period 2010-15 masks shifts in the distribution of KSIs between different road user groups, see Appendix 1 for data by road user mode. The contrast between trends in KSIs for vulnerable road users (VRUs) and occupants of motor vehicles (MV users) is shown in Figure 1. Before 2010, KSIs went down for both groups but significantly less for VRUs (down 15%, as against 32% for motor vehicle occupants). From 2010 to 2015, KSIs for motor vehicle users decreased by 9% but those for VRUs actually increased 5%.




Figure 1 KSIs in England and Wales, 2005-15

2. An injury for which a person is detained in hospital as an “in-patient”, or any of the following injuries whether or not they are detained in hospital: fractures, concussion, internal injuries, crushings, burns (excluding friction burns), severe cuts, severe general shock requiring medical treatment and injuries causing death 30 or

London vs rest of England and Wales

Further analysis reveals important differences between London and the rest of England and Wales.

In the earlier period (2005-09), trends are broadly similar. But in the period following 2010, KSIs continue to decline in London for both motor vehicle (MV) occupants and VRUs.

These trends and the contrast between London and rest of England and Wales are illustrated in Figure 2 (for MV occupants) and in Figure 3 (for VRUs). In each Figure, KSIs are shown relative to their value in 2005.

By 2015, MV occupant KSIs had dropped by almost two thirds in London but only by around one third outside. But this difference results almost entirely from the faster decline in London after 2010.

For VRUs, there were similar declines in the earlier period in both London and in the rest of England and Wales. Subsequently, numbers continued to decline in London but rose outside.

If Britain's status of having one of the leading road safety records in the world is to be maintained, it is critical that these following changes are understood:

- ▶ the abrupt halt in the decline of KSIs in 2010,
- ▶ the differences in trends for VRUs and MV occupants, and
- ▶ the strong contrast between London and the rest of England and Wales.




Figure 2 MV occupant KSIs, inside and outside London, 2005-15




Figure 3 VRU KSIs, inside and outside London, 2005-15

Numbers of Traffic Officers

The decline in the overall levels of police budgets and staffing due to austerity is well known. Recent estimates by the police show a decline in staff posts 15,500 (19.5%) between 2010 and 2015 (NPCC, 2016), see Appendix 2. For the first time, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is warning of a national crisis in the shortage of crime detectives and crime investigators. This is leading to excessive workloads and stress amongst those currently in the roles (HMIC, 2017).

According to the Home Office, police are counted as traffic officers if they are predominantly employed:

- ▶ on motor-cycles or in patrol vehicles for the policing of traffic and motorway related duties. This includes officers employed in accident investigation, vehicle examination and radar duties.
- ▶ to support the traffic function of the force including radar, accident investigation, vehicle examination and traffic administration.
- ▶ working with hazardous chemicals and serving the internal needs of the traffic function of the force and those officers/staff in supporting roles (Home Office, 2016).

Traffic policing has experienced more than its share of the cuts. Information on Traffic Police numbers is from two Parliamentary Questions³. Numbers over this period are difficult to track due to internal reorganisations and the pooling of specialist functions across services. The clearest anomaly of this sort is in the numbers quoted for the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), where a reclassification of functions led to the reported number of traffic officers rising by over 500% between 2014 and 2015 (Cycling UK, 2017). Setting aside the MPS, traffic officers in other police services decreased 28% in 2010-15. This is substantially more than the decline in overall police numbers.

Decisions leading to this disproportionate decline have been taken largely by Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). Police are evaluated each year by HMIC through a programme designed to assess police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL). The frequency of different types of crime relative to population is used as part of this process. But, though indicators include shoplifting and bicycle theft, road crime (i.e. driving offences) are excluded as they do not qualify as notifiable crime.

Local priorities are determined by the PCC. As Cycling UK has pointed out (Cycling UK, 2017), a PCC under extreme budgetary pressure is unlikely to direct resources to unassessed areas.

In addition, there is the complication that PCCs are elected by voters who are both actual motorists and potential road victims, and can see themselves as either. So, electoral support for measures targeting road crime can be more equivocal than for other crime categories (Wells, 2016). Lacking both performance incentives and the prospect of clear electoral reward, this relative downgrading of traffic enforcement capacity in a period of extreme cutbacks is a key risk. To combat this RoadPeace has led calls for PEEL to be extended to roads policing with road traffic crime prevention and collision investigation evaluated. These calls have been supported by British Cycling, Cycling UK, LCC, Living Streets, Road Danger Reduction Forum and 20s Plenty for Us (RoadPeace, 2017a).

But policing in London does not face the same pressure. The Roads and Transport Policing Command (RTPC) of the MPS gets significant funding from Transport for London. With 2,300 officers, this unit has five primary activities: one is to target crime on the transport network; the other four relate to the activities usually undertaken by traffic police – the deterrence, investigation and prevention of road collisions (TfL, 2017). The number of officers assigned to traffic enforcement remains unclear, due to the change in reporting formats (see above); but in the period 2010-14, when a consistent format was used, the decline was only 11%, less than half the rate for the other police services.

3. (Home Office, 2015) covering the period 2010-14 and (Home Office, 2016), which provided the data for 2015

Concern has been raised by a variety of organisations about the effect of manpower reductions on the effectiveness of traffic law enforcement – see evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee (HoCTC 2016)⁴. Its subsequent report was published under the headline “Motoring offences undetected due to fewer specialist traffic officers⁵”. One year on, traffic police numbers are down further and cause for this concern has only grown.

4. RAC, evidence to the Transport Committee Inquiry on Traffic Law Enforcement (RTL0005)

5. <https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/transport-committee/news-parliament-2015/road-traffic-law-enforcement-report-published-15-16/>

Trends in enforcement: How traffic offences are dealt with

There are three principal types of sanction for law breaking motorists:

- ▶ a court prosecution,
- ▶ a fixed penalty notice (FPN)
- ▶ a diversionary course, part of the National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme (NDORS)

In 2010-15, the overall number of traffic disposals has stayed fairly static. There were just fewer than 3 million at the start and, following a slight dip, just over 3 million at the end, a rise of 2.5%.

A closer look at the detail reveals important underlying changes in traffic law enforcement (A full breakdown of FPNs and NDORS courses and prosecutions are given in Appendices 3–5).

Growth in use of diversionary courses

The balance between different forms of sanctions has changed. There has been a steady decline in FPNs (down 45%) and a steady increase in diversionary schemes (up 200%), see Figure 4. Court prosecutions remained comparatively minor (just above one in five disposals) and stable. Though within this, there have been declines for the most serious offences.




Figure 4 Disposals by Category, 2010-15

Diversionary courses were introduced in 2004. On these, offending motorists who have not attended a course in the previous three years can avoid both penalty points and often the associated increase in the cost of their car insurance. They do pay for the course but this is often little more than the fine they also avoid. In 2011, there was a push to increase the range of educational courses that can be offered instead of FPNs to develop safer and more responsible driving behaviour as part of the Department for Transport’s strategy for improving road safety (DfT, 2011). The range of courses has expanded from three to seven. As can be seen in Appendix 4, NDORS was and remains dominated by the National Speed Awareness Course (NSAC). The expansion of the number of motorists on NDORS courses from around 470,000 to 1.4 million and increased their proportion of traffic disposals from 16% in 2010 to 46% in 2015.

These courses are welcomed by both motorists and the police, who receive a cost recovery element for each attendee. What remains unclear is whether, on balance, they make the roads safer. Their educational function is valued – by some motorists at least. However, a study on speeding and totting up disqualifications found that

drivers' behaviour only really changed when they faced a real risk of disqualification for a subsequent infringement (TRL, 2008). A diversionary course, by postponing points and their associated costs to a second offence, may defer behavioural change.

In response to concerns raised by the Transport Committee (HoCTC, 2016a), the government has commissioned a study on the effectiveness of NSAC, supervised by a diverse committee of stakeholders (HoCTC, 2016b). Given, how much of traffic law enforcement now depends on NDORS, it is critical that the methodology of this study is sound and that it is conducted thoroughly. Otherwise the question of whether this policy shift may have contributed to halting the decline in KSIs will linger.

Expanding share of speeding

Speeding is the most common offence for all three types of disposal. NSAC accounted for 96% of NDORS course attendance in 2010. Though the number of other NDORS courses more than doubled in the following five years, the number of motorists attending NSAC was still 86% of the total NDORS attendance in 2015.

Speeding FPNs did decline as NSAC increased in number, but as a proportion they went from just over half of FPNs in 2010 to nearly four out of five in 2015 (This pattern may be explained by the very high proportion of sanctions being given for speeding and the fact that repeat offenders will get FPNs.)

For court prosecutions, including the related offence *Failing to supply information as to identity of driver*, speeding has risen from one in four offences to two in five.

Table 1 Share of speeding related offences in traffic disposals in England and Wales, 2010-15						
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Speeding						
NDORS	447,724	772,430	926,101	953,432	1,187,240	1,215,799
FPNs	986,744	738,528	729,299	711,739	743,054	790,956
Court prosecutions						
– Speeding	127,600	122,561	123,386	126,693	159,285	179,883
– Failing to supply info.	41,296	60,772	65,153	63,079	64,623	84,741
<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>1,603,364</i>	<i>1,694,291</i>	<i>1,843,939</i>	<i>1,854,943</i>	<i>2,154,202</i>	<i>2,271,379</i>
Other offences						
NDORS	19,877	21,259	37,526	117,726	168,556	187,756
FPNs	852,407	701,255	579,755	432,791	279,298	225,871
Court prosecutions	512,698	426,612	381,803	375,738	367,098	379,518
<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>1,384,982</i>	<i>1,149,126</i>	<i>999,084</i>	<i>926,255</i>	<i>814,952</i>	<i>793,145</i>
Total sanctions	2,988,346	2,843,417	2,843,023	2,781,198	2,969,154	3,064,524
Speed %	54%	60%	65%	67%	73%	74%

The share speeding in total traffic disposals has risen significantly, from just over half in 2010 to nearly three quarters in 2015, even though the percentage of vehicles in free flow exceeding the speed limit has declined (DfT, 2016b). Conversely, other (non-speed) offences have fallen from 46% to 26% of the total.

RoadPeace appreciates the need for the enforcement of speed limits. Many drivers over-rate their own relative driving abilities and fail to appreciate the non-linear relationship between speed and damage. We need lower speeds for many reasons. However, this picture seems to suggest that other (non-speed) offences are becoming systematically downgraded within the system.




Figure 5 Proportion of Speeding FPNs from Cameras

Declining role of traffic officers in enforcement

The declining role of traffic officers starts with the growing share of all traffic offences accounted for by speeding, which has been largely dependent on cameras for many years. But it is compounded by:

- ▶ the share of cameras in speeding has been increasing for FPNs.
- ▶ the way disposals for speeding are determined makes it reasonable to assume that a similar shift away from officer led enforcement has taken place for NSACs and speeding prosecutions.

Data on FPNs provides a breakdown of both Speed limit offences, according to whether they were Camera-detected or Non-camera [Officer] detected. Over the period, the percentage of speeding FPNs from cameras rose from 79% to 92%, see Figure 5.

A similar breakdown is not given for diversionary schemes or court prosecutions but they arise from the same enforcement process: for each speed limit there is a defined margin in which motorists will be offered a diversionary course, unless they have (recently) been on one; beyond the margin, it is advised that drivers be prosecuted (ACPO, 2013). Assuming the same changes in the ratio of camera to officer initiated sanctions for FPNs (Figure 5) applies to NSAC courses and speeding prosecutions, the share in officer led policing would be as shown in Table 2.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Camera	1,352,139	1,441,203	1,593,237	1,646,432	1,962,495	2,128,130
Officer	1,636,207	1,402,214	1,249,786	1,134,766	1,006,659	936,394
Total	2,988,346	2,843,417	2,843,023	2,781,198	2,969,154	3,064,524
Camera %	45%	51%	56%	59%	66%	69%
Officer %	55%	49%	44%	41%	34%	31%
Change in Officer sanctions as % of 2010	0%	-14%	-24%	-31%	-38%	-43%

Note: See Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 for assumptions made on camera shares

Cameras are estimated to account for less than half of total disposals in 2010 but more than two thirds in 2015.

The role of technology in roads policing was the subject of a parliamentary enquiry just over a decade ago. Many of the witnesses endorsed the merits of a range of technologies, but emphasised the advantages of traffic officers with regard to their immediate responsiveness and the much wider range of problems with which they could deal, including drink and drug driving, careless and dangerous driving, and failure to use safety belts (HoCTC, 2006). Many of technologies discussed then and the issues raised for levels of staffing and deployment remain unchanged today. As they made clear in the title of their inquiry, the challenge for roads policing and technology is still that of getting the right balance.

The danger of enforcement by officers reducing by 43% in six years is that many offences causing actual danger and injury may now be escaping sanction.

Safety critical driving offences

Enforcement and investigation of all motoring offences ultimately contribute to well-ordered roads, improving the safety of vehicles and reducing the numbers of unsafe drivers. All of these will increase road safety for road users. However, certain offences can be seen as being safety critical – where action is most clearly directed against bad driving and keeping the public safe. In this list we would include:

- ▶ the “fatal four”, the offences most often addressed in road safety campaigns: speeding, drink driving, mobile phone use and seatbelt violations
- ▶ offences where police respond to bad driving – causing death by driving offences, dangerous driving, careless driving and failing to stop
- ▶ disqualified driving – which seeks to keep re-offenders off the road
- ▶ and uninsured driving (a focus of much government attention and believed to be associated with bad driving)

Speeding sanctions, and role of cameras in the role of their growth, has already been covered in the previous section. This section looks at the other offences/offence groupings, which are largely dependent on traffic officers for their enforcement. Each is looked at in turn before concluding with a summary section.

Causing death by driving offences

Since 2010, in addition to the decrease in traffic officers, there have been various changes in the way collision investigation is managed, how staff are trained and in the guidance followed. The lengthy Road Death Police Manual, introduced in 2001 by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO, 2001), was replaced by much shorter national guidance issued (College of Policing, 2013).

A fatal collision investigation will lead either to the criminal court or to the coroners court. The thoroughness of the investigation will increase the likelihood of both criminal prosecution and conviction. Data on the four main causing death offences can be seen in detail in Appendix 6. Table 3 below summarises the outcomes for these offences as a group and compares them to the total number of fatal collisions in each year in England and Wales.

This shows that in this period, there was a 5% reduction in fatal collisions but a 23% reduction in the numbers of drivers going to trial for these offences. Further, there was a decline in the conviction ratio of seven percentage points, from 85% to 78%. In total this meant that the proportion of fatal collisions resulting in a conviction for a causing death by driving offence fell from 30% to 22%.

Table 3 Fatal crashes, prosecutions and convictions, England and Wales, 2010-15							
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Fatal collisions	1,542	1,621	1,481	1,449	1,480	1,464	-5%
Causing death by driving prosecutions	537	488	459	414	402	414	-23%
Convictions	455	406	373	349	312	321	-29%
Convictions Rate (%)	85%	83%	81%	84%	78%	78%	-7%
Prosecutions per Fatal Collision	35%	30%	31%	29%	27%	28%	-7%
Convictions per Fatal Collision	30%	25%	25%	24%	21%	22%	-8%

Source: (MoJ, 2016) (DfT, 2016)

Failing to stop (Hit and run)

Motorists who have been caught after leaving the scene of a collision can only be prosecuted at court, whether an injury was caused or just property damage. There is no FPN or NDORS course for leaving the scene.

There are three related charges in this offence grouping, see Table 4, the most common of which is Failing to stop. Between 2010 and 2015, prosecutions for all three dropped year on year, cumulatively by 32%.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Failing to stop after accident, etc	3,881	3,467	2,962	2,900	2,729	2,659	-31%
Failing to report accident within 24 hours	1,604	1,391	1,247	1,183	1,012	1,068	-33%
Failing to give name and address after accident	1,535	1,323	1,343	1,133	1,066	1,075	-30%
Total	7,020	6,181	5,552	5,216	4,807	4,802	-32%

Source: (MoJ, 2016b)

It seems highly improbable that this 32% drop in prosecutions simply reflects a decline in the number of drivers failing to stop. As seen in Table 4 casualty collisions involving a driver leaving the scene have increased.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change from 2010
Fatal	52	68	65	54	60	71	37%
Serious	1,389	1,536	1,503	1,389	1,451	1,481	7%
Slight	14,346	14,628	13,468	13,439	14,615	14,998	5%
Total	15,787	16,232	15,036	14,882	16,126	16,550	5%

Source: (DfT, 2016a)

In London, the rise in the last few years has been the object of particular concern and commentary. In 2010, they represented 14% of all casualty collisions but this had risen by half to 20% by 2015 (Berry, 2016). In England and Wales, reported casualty hit and runs have risen by 5%.

Dangerous driving

The Strategic Framework for Road Safety (DfT, 2011) was specific in its ambition to crack down on the minority that commit serious, deliberate and repeated offences. There is no FPN or NDORS course available for dangerous driving. It is only prosecuted at court and it is rare (10 motorists per day for the whole of England and Wales). Taking into account the new causing serious injury by dangerous driving, there was a slight (5%) increase between 2010 and 2015.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Dangerous Driving	3,495	3,298	2,998	2,984	3,031	3,394	-3%
Causing serious injury by dangerous driving			1	92	212	273	N/A
Total	3,495	3,298	2,999	3,076	3,243	3,667	5%

Source: (MoJ, 2016a)

And not only is dangerous driving prosecuted very rarely, its' use relative to the number of KSIs is highly variable across the country. Appendix 7 shows the number of KSIs per dangerous driving prosecution by police authority and police region and how this has changed over the five years from 2010. For each Police Authority, local circumstances will influence the value of this figure. The relative change in it is value is, however, more important as a benchmark. This figure is given in the final column of Appendix 7.

A positive value suggests declining performance: KSIs are either rising faster than prosecution or falling slower than prosecutions. Two police regions stand out, the South East (excluding London) and the East of England, which includes Norfolk, the police service with the single largest increase (162%). Dyfed-Powys had the second largest increase (112%). The divergence between police services in performance is similar to a previous study, which found Norfolk prosecuted almost 17 times more drivers for careless driving than dangerous driving, compared to (RoadPeace, 2014b)⁷.

A negative figure indicates the reverse. London is the region with the largest decline (-31%), due to the Metropolitan Police Service. The police services⁶ with the largest decreases are Cheshire (-49%), Gwent (-47%) and Warwickshire (-36%).

Drink and drug driving

Breath testing is largely a discretionary activity based on policy and manpower availability. Despite the police agreement to breathalyse all drivers in collisions which they attend, less than half of car drivers in casualty collisions were tested in England and Wales in 2015 (DfT, 2016a).

Table 7 Breath tests, refusals and drink and drug prosecutions, 2010-15

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Number of tests	736,846	685,992	686,346	676,353	606,241	520,219	-29%
Positive or refused tests	84,436	80,761	76,179	70,675	65,585	60,019	-29%
Positive/refused (%)	11.5	11.8	11.1	10.4	10.8	11.5	
Court prosecutions							
Driving a motor vehicle under the influence of drink or drugs	53,686	50,485	47,300	43,151	40,384	40,173	-25%
Other offences related to drink- or drug-driving	3,423	3,503	6,456	8,068	7,939	8,367	144%
Total prosecutions	57,109	53,988	53,756	51,219	48,323	48,540	-15%

Source: (Home Office, 2016), (MoJ, 2016)

Breath tests given declined 29%, with the proportion failing/refusing remaining constant, see Table 7. Prosecutions in this period have dropped by 15%, so the proportion of those failing who face prosecution has increased.

Surveys, reliant on self-reporting, indicated that the frequency of drink driving was around the same or slightly higher in 2014/15 than in 2009/10 (RAS51101a). Self-reported drug driving had declined (RAS1101b) in this period but offences relating to drug driving were a tiny fraction (less than 2%) of the total for these offences (MoJ, 2016b).

6. Comparisons of years for police services are less robust than for police regions because the numbers involved are smaller and more variable.

7. This was before FPNs and NDORS were widely used for careless driving.

Disqualified driving

Prosecutions for driving whilst disqualified have fallen by a third between 2010-15. This offence does not have any out of court disposal options. And penalties have been made tougher for dangerous drivers who have caused fatal or serious injury crashes, with new charges introduced in 2015 for Causing Death/Serious Injury by Disqualified Driving.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Driving while disqualified	11,122	9,379	8,191	7,635	7,020	7,042	-37%

Source: (MoJ, 2016a)

This decline should not necessarily be interpreted as a decline in police performance, as there may simply be fewer violators to catch. The number of drivers banned at any one time is not reported. But we do know that in the period 2010 to 2015, the number of drivers receiving a disqualification at court dropped by 31% (RoadPeace, 2016). A large drop in the number of disqualified drivers would mean fewer violators.

Uninsured driving

Sanctions for driving without insurance have decreased 37% since 2010.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Using motor vehicle uninsured against third party risks	129,010	109,987	94,976	91,965	80,655	7,9195	-39%
Vehicle insurance FPNs	22,196	24,035	24,254	21,061	16,524	15,840	-29%
Total	151,206	134,022	119,230	113,026	97,179	95,035	-37%

Source: (MoJ, 2016a), (Home Office, 2016c)

However, since 2005, police have had the powers to stop and seize uninsured vehicles, which then may be auctioned or scrapped. This additional sanction has not been consistently reported, though this information can be obtained through Freedom of Information requests. A cumulative total of 1.5 million vehicles seized was reported in July 2016 (Motor Insurers Bureau, 2016).

Careless driving offences

In 2011, the DfT's Strategic Framework noted the significant fall in careless driving convictions without evidence of corresponding improvement in driver behaviour (DfT, 2011). To address this the government promoted the use of an FPN for careless driving. Since then, little has changed: the number of court prosecutions has continued to decline (50%). There has been an increase in NDORS but FPNs stayed about the same. The net change was an overall decline (22%).

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change from 2010
Careless driving prosecutions	35,255	31,390	24,414	19,650	17,431	17,586	-50%
FPNs	3,398	3,477	3,667	3,741	4,156	3,289	-3%
NDORS (NDIS / NDAC + D4C)	19,424	20,608	22,579	21,911	24,020	24,160	24%
Total	58,077	55,475	50,660	45,302	45,607	45,035	-22%

Sources: See Appendices 2-4

With KSIs largely unchanged, there would seem to be no evidence for a corresponding improvement in the standard of driving behaviour.

8. There is also a new offence for keeping a vehicle which does not meet insurance requirements.

Mobile phone use while driving

Whilst the number of sanctions has changed little, the shift from FPNs to diversionary courses has significantly affected the number of drivers receiving penalty points.

There has been a 50% reduction in court prosecutions and an 86% decline in FPNs. But the What's Driving Us (WDU) NDORS course used for mobile phone offenders is also used for those going through red lights, aggressively tailgating, crossing solid white lines when overtaking etc (NDORS, 2017). As the total number of drivers going on WDU in 2015 was 2,139 less than the cumulative fall in prosecutions and FPNs for hand held mobile phone use, sanctions are definitely down. The use of WDU for other offences will determine the extent of this.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Using or causing others to use a handheld mobile phone whilst driving (Court)	35,255	31,3990	24,414	19,650	17,431	17,586	-50%
Use of hand-held mobile phone while driving (FPN)	124,728	123,137	92,665	52,364	29,749	16,861	-86%
Whats Driving Us? (NDORS)			10,724	65,031	99,668	123,397	100%
Total	159,983	154,527	127,803	137,045	146,848	157,844	-1%

Sources: See Appendices 2-4

Up till 2011, all drivers sanctioned for mobile phone use would have received a fine and three points on their licence. By 2015, the numbers getting points had dropped by 78%. As noted above, it still needs to be proved that attending an NDORS course is as effective as points on the licence at modifying driver behaviour.

Compliance with the law on this is particularly poor. The numbers sanctioned are tiny compared to the level of violation. In 2016, the RAC Foundation reported that use of hand-held mobiles was reaching "epidemic proportions", with 48% of drivers admitting that they have received a call while driving in the last year; 13% gave use of mobiles by other drivers as their greatest concern on the roads – compared to 5% whose main concern was others driving under the influence of alcohol (RAC Foundation, 2016).

But, is there any reason to believe that the changes in the level of compliance could explain the decline in enforcement? The official data on this is not completely clear. The most recent (2014) survey was "not directly comparable to the results from the previous mobile phone surveys due to changes in the methodology and geographical coverage of the survey sites in 2014" (DfT, 2015, p. 8). The comparison it went on to make found mobile use slightly up from 2009. Other sources, using consistent methodology, have found larger differences. Observations at a series of sites in Hampshire found that the number of car drivers observed using a hand-held mobile had increased from 1.5% to 3.6% between 2008/9 and 2014 (TRL, 2015). Given this decline in compliance, it would have been expected that sanctions would have increased. This is not the case.

Non-wearing of seat belts

Here the nearly 90% decline in the use of the FPN has only been partially offset by the use in the new NDORS course. Overall there has been a two thirds decline in enforcement.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Seat belt FPNs	176,403	140,900	116,727	75,348	35,572	19,808	-89%
NDORS (Your Belt Your Life)			3,633	29,864	43,867	39,213	100%
Total	176,403	140,900	120,360	105,212	79,439	59,021	-67%

Sources: (Home Office, 2016c)

The best evidence on compliance with seat belt legislation comes from the most recent (2014) survey commissioned (DfT, 2015). Compliance rates were measured for different categories of vehicle and for car users (driver, front passenger, rear passenger, child rear passenger). Compared to the previous (2009) survey these were all high (over 90%) and, apart from child passengers, they were all rising. But in the category with the greatest decline in non-compliance (car drivers), the improvement was 56%⁹. So the 67% decline in sanctions could not be explained by this, even if they were only given to car drivers.

Summary for Safety Critical Offences

The number of sanctions for all the safety critical offences in the period 2010-15 are summarised in Table 13 below¹⁰. Speeding violations were always dominant. They accounted for around three quarters of sanctions for these offences in 2010. By 2015, they had risen 40%, while sanctions for the other offences had declined 33%.

Table 13 Changes in sanctions for safety critical traffic offences, England and Wales, 2010-15							
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
KSIs in England and Wales	22,344	22,982	22,652	21,540	22,682	22,114	-1%
Speeding (Court/FPN/NDORS)	1,562,068	1,633,519	1,778,786	1,791,864	2,089,579	2,186,938	40%
Sanctions/day	4,280	4,475	4,873	4,909	5,725	5,991	40%
Sanctions/KSI	70	71	79	83	92	99	
Offences with court sanctions only							
Causing death by driving	537	488	459	414	402	414	-23%
Failing to stop etc	7,020	6,181	5,552	5,216	4,807	4,802	-32%
Dangerous driving (inc. Serious injury)	3,495	3,298	2,999	3,076	3,243	3,667	5%
Drink and drug offences	54,563	51,670	51,163	48,654	48,540	45,993	-16%
Driving while disqualified	11,122	9,379	8,191	7,635	7,020	7,042	-37%
Sub-total	76,737	71,016	68,364	64,995	61,297	61,918	-19%
Offences with non-court sanctions available							
Uninsured driving	151,206	134,022	119,230	113,026	97,179	95,035	-37%
Careless driving	58,077	55,475	50,660	45,302	45,607	45,035	-22%
Mobile phone offences	159,983	154,527	127,803	137,045	146,848	157,844	-1%
Seat belt offences	176,403	140,900	120,360	105,212	79,439	59,021	-67%
Sub-total	545,669	484,924	418,053	400,585	369,073	356,935	-35%
All offences (excluding speeding)	622,406	555,940	486,417	465,580	430,370	418,853	-33%
Sanctions/day	1,705	1,523	1,333	1,276	1,179	1,148	-33%
Sanctions/KSI	28	24	21	22	19	19	

The overall number of sanctions for the non-speeding offences declined 33%. For all the offence groupings, the numbers declined, mainly in the range of 20%-35%. The only offence grouping where sanctions went up was dangerous driving, which rose by 5%.

Also clear from this Table are how infrequent (and declining) are the sanctions for the most serious offences (court only offences). These have dropped from 3.5% of all safety critical sanctions to 2.4%.

Less serious offences, where FPNs or NDORS can be given, have seen a significant decrease (35%) in the overall number of sanctions. These offences have also seen a shift from sanctions that carry penalty points to NDORS, which do not. As a result, the sanctions faced by drivers are both less probable and less severe.

9. Driver compliance rose from 95.2% to 97.9%. Non-compliance dropped from 4.8% to 2.1%, i.e just over half (56%).

10. Uninsured driving and disqualified driving both declined significantly. But both have been omitted from the summary table because of difficulties of interpreting this change.

Conclusions

Our roads may not have seen an overall increase in numbers killed or seriously injured in recent years but the regular and sizable year on year declines that we were used to have halted. And, for vulnerable road users, KSIs are on the increase, particularly outside of London. It is not possible to state unequivocally what the cause of these changes has been. However, it is hard to imagine that the effect on enforcement of the decline in the numbers of traffic police has not played a major role.

Within a picture of total sanctions for motoring that was largely static, the decline in the role of police in enforcement has gone hand-in-hand with the increasing share of total sanctions accounted for by speeding and the rising importance of cameras to this. There has been a corresponding decline in sanctions for offences demanding significant officer inputs into detection, investigation or prosecution. There is little evidence of improvements in compliance that could provide an alternative explanation for these changes.

Beyond this picture of declining officer involvement in enforcement, there is also the question of whether deterrence has been weakened by the significant shift away from prosecutions and FPNs that carry penalty points – which increase the chances of disqualification and raise the cost of insurance – to NDORS courses that do not. The current investigation into speed awareness courses prompted by the HoCTC should resolve whether the educational approach has led to improved driving behaviour. But this will have to be an overall improvement, rather than just for the drivers taking the course, as the wider deterrent effect of points may be even more important than the effect on the individual.

The clearest sign of a system under stress was the substitution of the comprehensive ACPO Road Death Investigation Guide (ACPO, 2001) for a substantially slighter alternative. Simultaneous with this change and the reduction in the numbers of staff for collision investigation, there has been a decline in the proportion of drivers in fatal collisions going to trial and, of these, the proportion being convicted.

While all police budgets have been cut, it is clear that traffic budgets have been cut disproportionately. Part of the reason for this may be the incentives faced by Chief Constables. They are judged in two ways, by HMIC inspections (through the PEEL process) and by the PCCs, who have the powers to sack them and set strategy and budgets. HMIC focuses on notifiable crime, which excludes motoring crime. Elected PCCs are beholden to voters, who are more likely to be motorists than victims and so unlikely to make traffic law enforcement a priority. The way HMIC inspections are weighted is the easier of these biases to rectify. It needs to be if Britain is to keep its road safety record.

Evaluating the effectiveness of policing activity is difficult. Though there have been important strides in the public reporting of both criminal justice statistics and FPNs, a lack of transparency remains a problem.

Of particular importance is the need to publish NDORS data for each police service. NDORS is too important not to be covered, particularly when PCCs are supposed to be accountable to voters.

The UK government is proud of its road safety record. It was achieved by decades of careful and pragmatic marginal gains in policy and practice. The recent halt in the decline of KSIs which followed the cuts in traffic policing should be a wake up call that this record is now in danger. It is right that laws on speeding is widely enforced but other laws also need enforcement. This needs effective sanctions and the traffic officers to impose them. Without this our roads are destined to become increasingly lawless.

Appendix 1. Trends in killed and Seriously injured (KSI)

Appendix Table 1.1 KSI casualties by road user type, 2005-15, England and Wales													
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2005-2009	2010-2015
Pedestrian	6,386	6,302	6,270	5,937	5,489	5,101	5,349	5,459	4,955	5,027	4,884	-14%	-4%
Pedal cyclist	2,228	2,301	2,413	2,401	2,553	2,626	3,029	3,162	3,090	3,347	3,168	15%	21%
Motorcyclist	6,103	6,074	6,316	5,619	5,447	4,829	5,283	4,964	4,893	5,271	5,118	-11%	6%
Car occupant	13,160	12,821	11,697	10,612	9,861	8,741	8,378	8,113	7,617	8,053	7,929	-25%	-3%
Motor vehicle (other)	1,337	1,420	1,368	1,172	1,069	1,047	943	954	985	984	1,015	-20%	-9%
All KSI casualties	29,214	28,918	28,064	25,741	24,419	22,344	22,982	22,652	21,540	22,682	22,114	-16%	-1%

Sources: GB totals (DfT, 2016). Less Scotland totals (Transport Scotland, 2016)

Appendix Table 1.2 KSI casualties by road user type, 2005-15, London													
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2005-2009	2010-2015
Pedestrian	1,224	1,303	1,292	1,208	1,055	913	980	1,123	838	779	730	-14%	-20%
Pedal cyclist	372	392	461	445	433	467	571	671	489	432	387	16%	-17%
Motorcyclist	845	848	819	738	706	615	599	629	510	526	540	-16%	-12%
Car occupant	1,007	1,146	983	907	847	744	524	466	357	329	332	-16%	-55%
Motor vehicle (other)	202	257	229	228	186	147	131	129	130	101	103	-8%	-30%
All KSI casualties	3,650	3,946	3,784	3,526	3,227	2,886	2,805	3,018	2,324	2,167	2,092	-12%	-28%

Sources: Data for 2005-14 (DfT, 2016). Data for 2015 (TfL, 2016)

Appendix Table 1.3 KSI casualties by road user type, 2005-15, England & Wales (excl. London)													
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2005-2009	2010-2015
Pedestrian	5,162	4,999	4,978	4,729	4,434	4,188	4,369	4,336	4,117	4,248	4,154	-14%	-1%
Pedal cyclist	1,856	1,909	1,952	1,956	2,120	2,159	2,458	2,491	2,601	2,915	2,781	14%	29%
Motorcyclist	5,258	5,226	5,497	4,881	4,741	4,214	4,684	4,335	4,383	4,745	4,578	-10%	9%
Car occupant	12,153	11,675	10,714	9,705	9,014	7,997	7,854	7,647	7,260	7,724	7,597	-26%	-5%
Motor vehicle (other)	1,135	1,163	1,139	944	883	900	812	825	855	883	912	-22%	1%
All KSI casualties	18,435	17,921	17,356	15,573	15,147	13,853	14,270	13,655	13,820	15,006	14,673	-18%	6%

Appendix 2. Traffic police officers in England and Wales, 31 March 2010 to 31 March 2015

Region/PA	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
North East	400	356	364	333	326	301	-25%
Cleveland	115	113	102	100	92	88	-24%
Durham	96	91	93	90	83	69	-29%
Northumbria	189	153	170	144	151	144	-23%
North West	821	793	789	770	698	672	-18%
Cheshire	90	76	109	106	89	119	32%
Cumbria	86	87	84	87	82	87	1%
Greater Manchester	310	296	282	284	248	226	-27%
Lancashire	171	159	155	145	142	113	-34%
Merseyside	164	176	161	148	136	127	-22%
Yorkshire and The Humber	659	639	563	534	527	291	-56%
Humberside	116	115	110	103	96	83	-29%
North Yorkshire	99	107	99	85	96	92	-7%
South Yorkshire	130	121	118	107	111	93	-28%
West Yorkshire	315	296	236	238	225	22	-93%
East Midlands	372	343	315	282	276	242	-35%
Derbyshire	88	84	75	69	65	64	-27%
Leicestershire	86	75	73	67	66	62	-27%
Lincolnshire	84	79	71	71	71	65	-22%
Northamptonshire	68	63	61	59	59	38	-44%
Nottinghamshire	47	43	36	16	15	13	-72%
West Midlands	530	457	436	466	448	416	-21%
Staffordshire	67	61	52	58	49	47	-30%
Warwickshire	10	10	25	39	37	35	248%
West Mercia	101	88	83	83	80	70	-31%
West Midlands	351	298	276	286	282	264	-25%
East of England	724	676	647	648	480	538	-26%
Bedfordshire	57	56	52	47	46	47	-17%
Cambridgeshire	101	95	86	85	76	72	-28%
Essex	257	227	229	217	76	148	-42%
Hertfordshire	139	132	124	110	99	91	-35%
Norfolk	103	101	100	96	95	91	-12%
Suffolk	67	65	56	92	88	89	33%
London	327	335	362	329	288	288	-12%
City of London	30	34	31	24	25	24	-22%
Metropolitan Police	297	301	331	306	264	264	-11%
South East	805	779	734	714	684	685	-15%
Hampshire	181	172	159	150	145	150	-17%
Kent	138	138	124	112	101	94	-32%
Surrey	100	89	94	99	96	94	-6%
Sussex	159	160	150	144	139	143	-10%
Thames Valley	228	219	207	209	203	204	-10%
South West	620	583	308	254	292	288	-54%
Avon and Somerset	157	147	130	101	96	62	-61%
Devon and Cornwall	239	235	-	-	57	88	-63%
Dorset	76	63	52	50	47	54	-30%
Gloucestershire	65	62	60	53	48	45	-32%
Wiltshire	83	76	66	50	44	40	-52%
Wales	378	368	349	345	336	332	-12%
Dyfed-Powys	84	83	78	81	77	80	-5%
Gwent	63	63	72	73	60	62	-2%
North Wales	88	83	69	67	70	68	-23%
South Wales	143	140	131	125	130	122	-15%
England & Wales	5,635	5,329	4,868	4,675	4,356	4,051	-28%

(Home Office, 2016a) for 2015 data, (Home Office, 2015) for 2010-14

Notes on Appendix 2 Table

Data on Years 2010-14

1. *This table contains full-time equivalent figures that have been presented to the nearest whole number.*
2. *Traffic function includes staff who are predominantly employed on motor-cycles or in patrol vehicles for the policing of traffic and motorway related duties. This includes officers employed in accident investigation, vehicle examination and radar duties. Also includes staff who are predominantly employed to support the traffic function of the force including radar, accident investigation, vehicle examination and traffic administration. Includes those officers working with hazardous chemicals, and those administrative staff predominantly serving the internal needs of the traffic function of the force and those officers in supporting roles.*
3. *Staff with multiple responsibilities (or designations) are recorded under their primary role or function. This may explain some variability between years.*
4. *Figures have been confirmed by all police forces after collection and before publication each year.*
5. *No reasons for the variation in Devon and Cornwall's figures were provided by the force, but the force did confirm each year's figures (showing zero in 2012 and 2013).*
6. *The variation in Essex Police's figures between 2013 and 2014 is due to a review of the functionality of roles within the force as part of their Change Programme.*

Data on 2015

1. *MPS data for 2015 different to that reported. Following a reclassification of functions, the reported number of traffic officers rose by over 500% between 2014 and 2015 (Cycling UK, 2017). Until further clarification is obtained, MPS traffic police numbers has been retained at 2014 levels.*

Appendix 3. Fixed Penalty Notices

Appendix 3. Fixed Penalty Notices						
	2010 ¹	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Speed limit offences	986,744	738,528	729,299	711,739	743,054	790,956
<i>Camera-detected</i>	783,666	599,931	609,216	611,849	668,081	730,223
<i>Non camera-detected</i>	203,078	138,597	120,083	99,890	74,973	60,733
Neglect of traffic directions	148,179	106,712	86,553	75,268	39,090	38,302
<i>Camera-detected</i>	70,258	53,469	42,185	42,971	19,128	24,650
<i>Non camera-detected</i>	77,921	53,243	44,368	32,297	19,962	13,652
Driving licence-related offences	7,687	9,980	8,910	8,082	6,983	6,721
Lighting offences	17,168	14,589	12,804	15,725	9,585	7,088
Load offences	8,822	9,607	10,183	8,973	7,587	5,812
Miscellaneous motoring offences (excluding seat belt offences)	6,139	1,087	843	588	662	674
Motorway offences (other than speeding)	3,281	3,121	3,647	1,735	1,475	1,623
Neglect of pedestrian rights	8,606	8,528	6,934	3,996	2,173	1,938
Noise offences	2,141	1,493	1,324	1,193	871	743
Obstruction, waiting and parking offences	199,393	130,120	96,034	55,722	46,098	42,760
Offences peculiar to motor cycles	1,092	1,321	1,076	796	505	425
Operator's licence offences		79	58	51	31	34
Seat belt offences	176,403	140,900	116,727	75,348	35,572	19,808
Use of hand-held mobile phone while driving	124,728	123,137	92,665	52,364	29,749	16,861
Use offences involving careless driving (excl. mobile phone)	3,398	3,477	3,667	3,741	4,156	3,289
Using or keeping a heavy goods vehicle if levy not paid					140	142
Vehicle insurance offences	22,196	24,035	24,254	21,061	16,524	15,840
Vehicle or part in dangerous or defective condition	21,877	22,252	19,752	18,345	11,637	8,301
Vehicle registration and excise licence offences	45,828	36,655	28,766	22,687	13,375	6,619
Vehicle test offences	55,469	57,315	58,071	60,988	48,525	43,637
Work record or employment offences		6,847	7,487	6,128	4,560	5,254
Total	1,839,151	1,439,783	1,309,054	1,144,530	1,022,352	1,016,827
Camera [Recorded]	853,924	653,400	651,401	654,820	687,209	754,873
Non-camera detected [Recorded]	985,227	786,383	657,653	489,710	335,143	261,954

Source: (Home Office, 2012) and (Home Office, 2016)

1. Note: 2010 data compiled using previous (VP/FPO) system, which results in marginally higher figures relative to other years where data was reported using the national fixed penalty processing system – PentIP.

Appendix 4. National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme

Appendix 4. National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme						
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
National Speed Awareness Course	447,724	772,430	926,101	953,432	1,185,860	1,207,570
National Driver Awareness Course	19,424	20,441	21,601	20,210	21,272	21,236
Rider Intervention Developing Experience	453	651	590	920	1,001	986
Driving for Change		167	978	1,701	2,748	2924
Whats Driving Us?			10,724	65,031	99,668	123,397
NSAC for 20mph					1,380	8,229
Your Belt Your Life			3,633	29,864	43,867	39,213
Total	467,601	793,689	963,627	1,071,158	1,355,796	1,403,555
For speeding (NSAC and NSAC for 20mph)	447,724	772,430	926,101	953,432	1,187,240	1,215,799
Other offences	19,877	21,259	37,526	117,726	168,556	187,756
Camera [Assumes FPN camera ratios for speeding NDORS]	355,580	627,471	773,613	819,621	1,067,449	1,122,445
Officer [Residual]	112,021	166,218	190,014	251,537	288,347	281,110

Source: (NDORS, 2017)

Appendix 5. Court Prosecutions for Motoring Offences, 2010-15

Appendix 5. Court Prosecutions for Motoring Offences, 2010-15							
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Causing Death by Aggravated Vehicle Taking	10	8	6	11	1	5	-50%
Causing Death by Dangerous Driving	196	177	163	144	176	188	-4%
Causing Death by Careless Driving when under the influence of Drink or Drugs	34	37	19	26	17	23	-32%
Causing Death by careless or inconsiderate driving	285	254	261	234	205	201	-29%
Causing death by driving unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured drivers	22	20	16	10	4	2	-91%
Causing bodily harm by furious driving	11	13	9	10	10	5	-55%
Causing serious injury by dangerous driving			1	92	212	273	N/A
Cause serious injury by driving whilst disqualified						2	N/A
Aggravated vehicle taking	3,860	3,756	3,097	2,705	2,636	2,612	-32%
Dangerous driving	3,495	3,298	2,998	2,984	3,031	3,394	-3%
Driving a motor vehicle under the influence of drink or drugs	53,686	50,485	47,300	43,151	40,348	40,173	-25%
Other offences related to drink- or drug-driving	3,423	3,503	6,456	8,068	7,939	8,367	144%
Failing to stop or provide information after accident	7,020	6,181	5,552	5,216	4,807	4,802	-32%
Failing to supply information as to identity of driver when required	41,296	60,772	65,153	63,079	64,623	84,741	105%
Fraud, forgery, etc. associated with vehicle or driver records	629	514	526	443	354	308	-51%
Miscellaneous motoring offences	48,662	14,858	12,131	14,603	17,252	16,166	-67%
Neglecting road regulations (other than speeding)	30,789	27,263	22,441	19,239	18,929	23,265	-24%
Careless driving offences (excl. mobile phone offences)	19,933	18,468	16,507	15,457	14,839	14,946	-25%
Causing danger by causing anything to be on a road or interfering with a vehicle or traffic equipment	149	152	135	114	106	93	-38%
Speed limit offences	127,600	122,561	123,386	126,693	159,285	179,883	41%
Theft of a motor vehicle (excluding aggravated vehicle taking) – summary Offence	4,385	4,009	3,370	2,991	2,967	2,813	-36%
Theft of a motor vehicle or other conveyance (excluding aggravated vehicle taking) – triable either way	1,382	1,446	1,167	1,265	1,245	1,125	-19%
Using or causing others to use a handheld mobile phone whilst driving	35,255	31,390	24,414	19,650	17,431	17,586	-50%
Driving licence related offences (excluding fraud and forgery)	35,340	28,612	24,061	21,156	18,281	16,888	-52%
Vehicle insurance offences	130,764	111,598	107,905	134,055	144,748	152,235	16%
Vehicle registration and excise licence offences	116,795	106,232	91,375	71,469	59,810	63,833	-45%
Vehicle test offences	5,612	4,250	3,035	3,385	3,298	3,154	-44%
Defective vehicle parts	9,669	8,885	7,911	8,436	7,830	6,392	-34%
Work record and employment offences	1,292	1,203	947	824	622	667	-48%
Grand Total	681,594	609,945	570,342	565,510	591,006	644,142	-5%
Camera (Speeding*FPN camera ratios+Failing to supply information as to identity of driver)	142,635	160,332	168,223	171,991	207,836	250,812	
Other	538,959	449,613	402,119	393,519	383,170	393,330	
% camera	21%	26%	29%	30%	35%	39%	

Source: (MoJ, 2016a)

Appendix 5. Causing death by driving offences – investigation outcomes

Appendix 5. Causing death by driving offences – investigation outcomes							
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Prosecutions							
Causing death by dangerous driving	196	177	163	144	176	188	-4%
Causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs	34	37	19	26	17	23	-32%
Causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving	285	254	261	234	205	201	-29%
Causing death by driving unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured drivers	22	20	16	10	4	2	-91%
<i>Total</i>	<i>537</i>	<i>488</i>	<i>459</i>	<i>414</i>	<i>1,355,796</i>	<i>1,403,555</i>	<i>-23%</i>
Findings of Guilt							
Causing death by dangerous driving	154	114	116	109	123	122	-21%
Causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs	41	35	23	29	25	21	-49%
Causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving	238	235	221	201	163	176	-26%
Causing death by driving unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured drivers	22	22	13	10	1	2	-91%
<i>Total</i>	<i>455</i>	<i>406</i>	<i>373</i>	<i>349</i>	<i>312</i>	<i>321</i>	<i>-29%</i>
Conviction Rate (%)							
Causing death by dangerous driving	79%	64%	71%	76%	70%	65%	-14%
Causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs	121%	95%	121%	112%	147%	91%	-29%
Causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving	84%	93%	85%	86%	80%	88%	4%
Causing death by driving unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured drivers	100%	110%	81%	100%	25%	100%	0%
<i>All offences</i>	<i>85%</i>	<i>83%</i>	<i>81%</i>	<i>84%</i>	<i>78%</i>	<i>78%</i>	<i>-7%</i>

Source: (MoJ, 2016a)

Appendix 7. KSIs/Dangerous driving prosecution by Police Area, 2010-15

Region/PA	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Difference	Difference
							1 year	5 yrs
North East	4.6	5.1	5.3	3.7	3.5	3.8	8%	-17%
Cleveland	2.8	3.5	4.2	2.3	3.3	3.5	7%	25%
Durham	5.8	7.0	5.7	3.9	3.0	4.1	37%	-29%
Northumbria	5.1	5.2	5.5	4.4	4.0	3.8	-3%	-24%
North West	4.9	5.5	5.3	6.0	5.6	4.6	-19%	-7%
Cheshire	11.4	12.0	11.5	9.6	10.3	5.9	-43%	-49%
Cumbria	4.1	3.7	3.2	5.6	3.7	5.1	37%	25%
Greater Manchester	3.7	3.7	3.0	3.4	3.7	3.0	-19%	-18%
Lancashire	7.1	8.1	7.2	8.4	6.9	6.1	-11%	-14%
Merseyside	3.2	4.8	6.9	7.5	6.5	4.5	-31%	44%
Yorkshire and The Humber	4.5	5.3	6.3	5.3	5.1	4.4	-14%	-3%
Humberside	6.4	5.7	7.5	10.0	9.0	6.6	-27%	3%
North Yorkshire	6.8	9.3	9.7	8.1	8.1	8.2	1%	20%
South Yorkshire	3.4	5.3	5.6	5.5	3.9	3.2	-17%	-4%
West Yorkshire	3.8	4.2	5.3	3.5	4.0	3.5	-12%	-8%
East Midlands	3.7	4.1	4.1	4.3	4.9	4.5	-8%	21%
Derbyshire	2.6	3.2	3.7	2.5	3.3	4.0	22%	54%
Leicestershire	6.3	8.6	12.9	9.6	13.5	11.7	-14%	86%
Lincolnshire	3.2	4.9	4.7	4.7	5.7	5.9	4%	84%
Northamptonshire	3.9	3.6	3.3	4.2	4.3	3.6	-17%	-10%
Nottinghamshire	6.6	7.4	7.6	6.9	7.5	6.0	-20%	-10%
West Midlands	7.4	8.0	10.4	8.5	9.7	6.3	-36%	-15%
Staffordshire	6.1	9.6	6.7	7.9	8.7	7.6	-13%	23%
Warwickshire	12.2	11.1	10.3	11.0	12.4	7.8	-37%	-36%
West Mercia	5.5	5.1	4.9	5.1	5.0	5.2	4%	-5%
West Midlands	5.2	6.1	7.7	5.3	5.4	4.7	-14%	-10%
East of England	6.7	8.1	10.4	8.7	10.9	8.6	-21%	27%
Bedfordshire	4.7	3.6	5.4	5.5	8.2	5.0	-39%	5%
Cambridgeshire	6.5	9.3	13.5	9.1	10.8	7.2	-33%	11%
Essex	9.4	12.4	11.6	9.2	13.5	12.3	-9%	31%
Hertfordshire	5.3	6.2	9.0	8.1	10.1	6.3	-37%	19%
Norfolk	6.8	7.8	9.8	14.0	10.0	17.8	78%	162%
Suffolk	7.0	9.9	16.9	7.4	10.9	7.2	-33%	4%
London	7.1	6.6	7.2	5.7	5.2	4.9	-7%	-31%
City of London	10.3	8.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Metropolitan	7.1	6.6	7.1	5.6	5.1	4.8	-6%	-32%
South East	8.4	9.1	12.0	11.5	13.3	10.8	-19%	29%
Hampshire	8.2	9.8	13.6	18.0	15.4	12.9	-17%	57%
Kent	6.4	6.3	7.2	7.7	8.5	7.5	-12%	17%
Surrey	19.4	19.4	16.4	11.4	23.4	16.4	-30%	-16%
Sussex	10.3	11.4	14.5	12.3	16.1	12.6	-21%	22%
Thames Valley	6.6	6.9	11.4	10.1	10.7	8.7	-19%	31%
South West	7.7	7.7	8.6	9.6	10.0	9.0	-10%	17%
Avon and Somerset	5.7	4.5	5.6	5.9	5.1	4.9	-4%	-13%
Devon and Cornwall	9.4	8.5	9.4	14.8	15.4	11.4	-26%	22%
Dorset	9.5	14.1	16.1	29.6	19.6	18.1	-8%	90%
Gloucestershire	8.9	12.2	8.4	6.6	9.9	9.0	-9%	1%
Wiltshire	7.7	9.3	10.5	8.1	11.7	11.9	1%	54%
Wales	4.2	4.8	4.3	5.3	5.3	4.9	-7%	18%
Dyfed-Powys	8.1	8.5	8.0	15.5	13.4	17.2	28%	112%
Gwent	3.3	2.7	2.6	3.0	2.6	1.7	-34%	-47%
North Wales	4.3	5.2	4.3	5.3	5.2	5.9	15%	37%
South Wales	3.0	4.2	3.4	4.5	4.9	3.9	-20%	29%
England & Wales	5.8	6.3	6.9	6.6	6.8	5.9	-13%	2%

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About RoadPeace

RoadPeace, the national charity for road crash victims, has been helping the families cope with the aftermath of road death and injury since 1992. We provide emotional support and information to help the bereaved and injured understand the justice system. RoadPeace also campaigns for the justice system and society in general to take road danger more seriously. This includes treating road traffic crime like other crime and ending the discrimination against road crash victims.

Office 020 7733 1603

Helpline 0845 4500 355

info@roadpeace.org

www.roadpeace.org

 [@roadpeace](https://twitter.com/roadpeace)

Registered charity no.1087192



This report was launched during
Global Road Safety Week, 8-14 May 2017